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succinctly it is, that the first is presumed to exist and must be
disproved, the second is presumed not to exist and must be proved.
(Of a further remedy in case of abuse of power in this respect by a superior

court.)
The only remedy, other than the limited power of revision above
set forth, according to the English, and more generally received
American doctrine, for any error, injustice, abuse of discretion,
oppressive or corrupt conduct on the part of the judge of a court
of the superior order, is by resort to an impeachment before the
legislature. Rex v. Davison, 4 B. & Ald. 329; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb 598; Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 259;
Williamson's Case, supra; In re Pryor, 18 Kansas 72.
A number of such cases may be found in our annals. Among
them may be mentioned that of Judge PECK, of a United States
District Court, before the House of Representatives in 1831, and
that of the judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1807,
which, though it ended in their acquittal, led to the passage of
the Act of Assembly of 1809, limiting the power of the court
over contempts.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.
Philadelphia.

(To be continued.)

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
JOHN G. HARRYMAN ET AL. v. ALBERT D. ROBERTS.
A judgment recovered against a defendant in another state, is a bar to a suit
brought upon the same cause of action in Maryland; and when it is relied on as a
plea in bar, the only question open for inquiry is, whether the court in which the
judgment was rendered, had jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter. The judgment is conclusive as to the merits of the controversy.
Where a suit is brought in one state on the same cause of action on which judgment has been recovered in another state, and such judgment is pleaded in bar to a
recovery in the second suit, it is not sufficient answer to such plea, to allege that a
motion was filed by the defendant in the court in which the judgment was rendered
to set the same aside on the ground that he was not indebted to the plaintiffs, and
that he had not been served with process ; and that for the purpose of pleading the
said judgment in bar in the second suit, the defendant fraudulently consented to
have the said motion overruled.
While it is essential to the validity of a judgment that the defendant should have
notice of some kind, it is not always necessary that he should be served with personal process.
Each state has the right to prescribe by law how its citizens shall be brought into
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from the Court of Common Pleas.
Wagner and Schryver as copartners, in Baltimore, made advances on consignments of broom corn to Roberts, of Ohio, the
APPEAL

appellee.

The advances exceeded the consignments some $2800.

Wagner died and Schryver went into partnership with Harryman.
Schryver, as surviving partner of Wagner & Schryver, assigned,
in writing, the claim against Roberts to Harryman & Schryver,
who, on the 18th of March 1878, instituted an attachment against

Roberts, and caused. the writ to be laid in the hands of various
parties as garnishees. The case is further stated in the opinion
of the court.
The court below sustained the defendant's demurrer, and the
plaintiffs then joined issue short on his third plea. An agreement
of counsel was filed waiving all errors in pleading.
Sebastian Brown, for appellants.
S D. Schmucker, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-The appellants instituted a non-resident attach-
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ment suit against the appellee, and caused the writ to be laid in the
hands of sundry persons as garnishees, against whom suits were
docketed in the usual form.
The appellee, defendant below, appeared to the short note case,
and pleaded, inter alia, that prior to the institution of this suit,
the plaintiffs had recovered a judgment against the defendant, for
the same cause of action in the Court of Common Pleas, for the
county of Ross, in the state of Ohio.
The plaintiffs filed four replications to the third plea.
The defendant joined issue on the third replication, and demurred
to the first, second and fourth replications.
In these replications the plaintiffs allege that the judgment relied
on in the defendant's pleas, is invalid, because a motion was filed
by the defendant to set it aside, on the ground that he was not indebted to the plaintiffs, and also because he had not been served
with process; and that for the purpose of pleading the alleged
judgment in bar in this suit, the defendant fraudulently consented
to have the said motion overruled.
The question then presented by the demurrer, is, whether these
facts are a sufficient answer to the defendant's pleas ?
Now it is well settled that a judgment recovered against a defendant in another state, is a bar to a suit brought upon the ame
cause of action in this state: Bank of United States v. JMerchants'
Bank, 7 Gill 415; Whitehurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 503-515; 2
Am. Lead. Cas. 617.
And when it is relied on as a plea in bar, the only question open
for inquiry is, whether the court in which the judgment was rendered had jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter. See cases
collated in 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 617.
The judgment is conclusive as to the merits of the controversy:
2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 679, 841; 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 612.
The fact then, that the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
judgment in the court in which it was rendered, and the grounds
on which the motion was based, are quite immaterial so long as the
judgment stands between the partit s. If the plaintiffs had a judgment against the defendant in Ohio, for the same cause of action
which they are prosecuting here, they certainly have no reason to
complain that the defendant agreed to have his motion to strike
out the judgment overruled. Be that as it may, the motion in no
manner affects the validity of the judgment, and constitutes no
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sufficient answer to the defendant's plea, and the demurrer was
therefore properly sustained.
The next question presented by the record is, whether the judgment offered in evidence is a valid judgment against the defendant?
It does not appear from the face of the judgment that personal
process was served upon the 'defendant, but it does appear that a
written notice was left at his place of residence.
It is essential, of course, to the validity of every judgment, that
the parties to be bound shall have notice of some kind, either actual
or constructive. Every one is entitled to his day in court, and to
the right of being heard before a judgment of any kind is rendered
against him. But it is not always necessary that personal process
shall be served upon him. Each state has the right to prescribe by
law how its citizens shall be brought into its courts. And whatever conflict there may be in some of the earlier cases on the subject, we think it is now well settled, that if process be served upon
the defendant, according to the laws of the state of which he is a
resident, and judgment be afterwards rendered against him, such
a judgment is as binding between the parties in this state, when
relied on as a bar to the prosecution of a second suit, upon the same
cause of action, as it is in the state where it was rendered: Price
v. Hickok, 39 Vt. 292 ; Neae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick. 52 ; Poorman
v. trane, 1 Wright (Ohio) 347; Hfinton v. Townes, Hill (S. C.)
439; Hunt v. Lyle, 8 Yerger 142; Green v. igarmiento, 1 Pet.
C. C. 74; Bangely v. Webster, 11 N. H. 299.
If so, the question then is, whether the service of the process in
this case was in conformity with the statute law of Ohio? To
prove this, the defendant offered to read in evidence as statute laws
of that state, from a book in two volumes published in 1860, entitled, "The Revised Statutes of the State of Ohio," of a general
nature, in force August 1st 1860, collated by Joseph R. Swan,
with notes of the decisions of the Supreme Court by Leander J.
Critchfield, and upon the title page of which appeared the following
words in printing: "Published fbr the State of Ohio, and distributed
to its officers, under the Act of the General Assembly, passed March
16th 1860 ;" to the reading of which the plaintiffs objected.
Article 37, sect. 47, of the Code, provides "that public or private
statutes of any state may be read in evidence from any printed volume purporting to contain the statutes of the said state." The
book from which the defendant proposed to read, not only purports
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to contain the statutes of Ohio, but upon the title page purports to
have been "published for the state of Ohio, and distributed to its
officers, under the Act of the General Assembly, passed March
16th 1860." It is a volume, therefore, strictly within the meaning
of the Code, and was, therefore, admissible in evidence.
The record of the Ohio judgment was properly certified, both
under the Rev. Stat. of the United States, ch. 17, sect. 905, and
under the provisions of the Code, art. 37, sect. 35. The clerk of
the Court of Common Pleas certifies, under the seal of the court,
that it is a true copy of the record, and the presiding judge of said
court certifies to the official character of the clerk, and the clerk
certifies, under the seal of the court, to the official character of the
judge. It was not necessary that the clerk should sign his full
Christian name to the certificate. The signature of "E. W. Pearson, Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas, of Ross county, Ohio,"
was sufficient.
There was no error in refusing the plaintiff's first prayer. In
order to make a judgment in a prior suit between the same parties
a bar to the second suit, it is only necessary to prove that the subject-matter of the two suits is substantially the same. The fact
that the forms of action in the two cases are different, does not
affect the question, provided the matter in controversy be the same:
Whitehurst v. Bogers, 38 Md. 503; State, use of Bruner v. Ramsburg, 43 Id. 325.
The second prayer was also properly refused. By it, the court
was requested to instruct the jury that the admission of one of the
plaintiffs, that the causes of action in this suit and the Ohio judgment, offered in evidence, are the same, was not binding upon the
other plaintiff. The plaintiffs were copartners, and continued to
be up to the trial below, and the admission of one member of the
firm relative to a matter of partnership concern was binding upon
the other partner: 1 Greenl. on Ev. 172, 174, 177; Doremus v.
MeCormick, 7 Gill 63.
It follows from what we have said, that there was no error in
granting the defendant's prayer.
The judgment below will, therefore, be affirmed.
One of the questions involved in the

frequently before the courts of England
It is pro.

above case, to wit, the question of the

and of the United States.

proof of foreign law, is of considerable

posed, therefore, in this note to consider,

interest, and has been, in various forms,

I. Whether a court will or will not
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take judicial notice of the law of a foreign country.
II. How and in what manner the law
of a foreign country is to be proved in
judicial proceedings.
III. Within whose province, that of
the court or that of a jury, the interpletation and decision of the question of
foreign law fall, after the testimony has
been presented.
IV. How far the general rules upon
the subject have been modified, in the
United States, when the question before
a court has been with reference to the
laws of a fellow member of the federal
union.
I. The rule may be said to be universal, that a court will not take judicial knowledge of foreign law. As said
by Lord LAbrGDALE, M. R., in the course
of his interesting and valuable opinion
in Earl Nelson v. Lord Bridport, 8
Beav. 527 (1845) : "With foreign laws
an English judge cannot be familiar;
there are many of which he must be
totally ignorant ; there is in every case
of foreign law an absence of all the
accurate knowledge and ready associations which assist him in the consideration of that which is the English law."
And as said by MARSHALL, C. J., in
Talbot v. Seeman, I Cr. 38 (1801) :
"The laws of a foreign nation designed
only for the direction of its own affairs
are not to be noticed by the courts of
other countries unless proved as facts."
There can be no doubt of the reasonableness of this rule, founded as it is in a
proper distrust of our own knowledge
and not in any spirit of exclusiveness,
nor of the unanimity with which it is
recognised, and under this head we shall
do no more than mention a few of the
cases in which it has been announced.
Freemoul v. Dedire, I P. Wins. 429
74
(1718); Mostyn v. Farrigas,COwp. 1
(1774) ; Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163
(1800) ; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cr. 187
Hosford v. Nichols, I Paige 220 (1828)
7nth v. Gould, 4 Moore P. C.21 (1842);

Owen v. Boyle, 15 Ale. 147 (1838); Damese v. Hale, I Otto 13 (1875) ; Bow
ditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 138 (1868).
I. Since, then, foreign laws, not
being judicially noticed, must be proved,
and proved as facts, the question arises,
how must they be proved ? The general
rule dominating the entire province of
evidence is, that all facts must be proved
by the best attainable evidence. This
rule obtains with reference to the proof
of foreign law, and Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Church v. Hubbart, supra,
thus applies it: "That no testimony
shall be received which presupposes better testimony attainable by the party
who offers it, applies to foreign law, as
it does to all other facts. The sanction of
an oath is required for their establishment, unless they can be verified by
some other such high authority, that the
law respects it not less than the oath of
an individual."
In England, the question of the proof
of foreign law has had quite an interesting history, and for a long time quite a
battle raged, as to whether foreign law,
especially if written, could be proved by
the testimony of an expert as any other
fact of science, or the court would consider as better evidence exemplifications,
or compared copies of codes and decrees,
and insist upon their production.
One of the earliest cases upon the subject of the manner of proof is Gage v.
Bulk'eley, Ridgw. Ca. temp. Hard. 276
(1744), in which Lord HARnDwCxKE is
reported to have held that, to prove the
foreign law the court would receive
printed reports ; "counsel's opinion of
the case is clear, but if it is doubtful, it
becomes matter of other evidence, and
the law must be proved." This would
not seem to be of much assistance in the
way of establishing a rule of evidence,
but to be little more than an announcement that the mind of the court must be
satisfied ; for who else is to say that the
case is so clear that the court can discover the law from printed reports and
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the onimon of counsel without resorting
to other evidence ? In Harfordv. Morris, 2 Hagg. 430 (1776), Sir GEORGE
M1y refused to accept proof of foreign
laws "by the opinions of lawyers, which
is the most uncertain way in the world,"
and required the laws to be laid before
him by certificates of the ordinances in
question. In Boeddinck v. Sdhneider, 3
Esp. 58 (1800),

Lord KExvos

held,

that the Russian law could not be proved
by parol, but must be proved by authenticated documents from Russia. In
this his lordship was afterwards sustained by the court in bane. In Gegg
v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166 (1811), Lord
ELLENBOROUGn

refused the testimony

ef a Surinam merchant as to the law of
that place, and held that the law, which
it was desired to prove, being in writing,
an authenticated copy of it must be produced. This case was followed by Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155 (1815),
in which GiBBs, C. J., took clearly a
distinction between the foreign lex scripta
and non scripta, saying: " Foreign laws,
not written, are to be proved by the
parol examination of witnesses of competent skill. But where they are in
writing, a copy, properly authenticated,
must be produced." In Dalrynple v.
Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. 54 (1811), however, Sir WILLIAM ScOTT received, to

prove the law of Scotland, the depositions of eminent Scotch advocates, although they referred to printed authorities
as forming the basis of their opinions.
With the exception of the last case, the
line would thus far seem to be pretty
strictly drawn with reference to the
proof of foreign law where, in any way,
a written law came into question, but in
Lacon v. Biggins, 3 Stark. 178 (1822),
in order to prove the French marriagelaw, a book was offered, to be sustained
by the testimony of the French viceconsul, that it contained the code of
French law, upon which he acted in his
official capacity. ABBOTT, L. C. J., at
first, thought it would be necessary to

prove the French law by an examined
copy, but, on Picton's Case, 30 St. Trials 454, being cited, he admitted the
book. He also admitted parol testimony that, by the French law, a marriage contracted otherwise than as prescribed by the Code, was void, although
there was no clause in the Code avoiding such a marriage. The first part of
this ruling may be said to be unsupported by authority. It was directly
against Richards v. Anderson, 1 Camp.
65 n. (1805), which, however, as a nisi
prius decision, was not of controlling
force, and P'cton's Case, on which the
judge rested, did not decide that an unauthenticated law book was evidence of
foreign law, but such a book was in that
case admitted by consent, the counsel
for the Crown desiring to give the accused every indulgence, in order that
the great question under consideration,
the right of General Picton to inflict
torture, might be fully considered.
Lacon v. Higgins may be, therefore,
said, as to this point, to be of no
weight; with regard, however, to the
admission of parol evidence, it followed,
and, perhaps, went a little beyond, Sir
WIIAM SCOTT's example in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, and is in accord
with later authority. After Dalrymple v.
Dalrymple, the tendency was shown to
consider the law of any foreign country as
a fact of science, a result of science, as
something distinct from statute or customary law taken in and by themselves
merely; since even with reference to
countries where the laws were written,
it was acknowledged that the law as law,
that which governed the actions, and by
which were determined the rights of men,
embraced, not only the statute, but the
interpretation and general acceptation
thereof, and, in accordance with this
view, the testimony of legal experts began to be more frequently relied on. In
Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. N. R. 502
(1828), the Court of Session took the
opinion of English counsel upon English
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law, and its course was approved by the
House of Lords. In Trimbey v. Vignier,
1 Bing. N. C. 151 (1834), the opinion
of French advocates was taken upon a
question of French law. By the time
the next case of importance arose the
mind of the court seemed to be directed
to the qualifications of a witness to foreign law, rather than to the general
question of the admissibility of parol evidence with reference thereto. In the
Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Jur. 793 (1844),
11 Cl. & Fin. 85, the question arose
under the Roman ecclesiastical law, and
was, whether under that law, a marriage, performed at Rome, between two
members of the English church, by a
priest, in Anglican orders, were valid.
Dr. Wiseman, who was then a Roman
Catholic bishop, and coadjutor to the
Vicar Apostolic in England, was biffred
as a witness to prove the Roman law of
marriage, and, having testified that he
had resided in Rome for a long time,
had studied the ecclesiastical law, and
that as Bishop, he had spiritual jurisdiction in marriage cases, he was permitted
to testify. At the same time, another
witness, one Lithgow, Superior of Stonyhurst College, who had gone through
the same course of training and instruction as Dr. Wiseman, was not allowed
to testify. The distinction was put upon
the ground that the knowledge of Lithgow
was merely theoretical, while that of Dr.
Wiseman was practical, or, if it had
never been put into actual practice, it
was, at least, an essential requirement
of his official position. In the language
of the Lord Chancellor (LvxDnURST),
Dr. Wiseman came "within the description of a person peritus virtute oficii."
Lord LANGDALE said:

"His evidence

is in the nature of that of a judge." Lithgow's, on the other hand, was that of
neither judge nor counsel, hut of mere
theorist. This decision was concurred
in by Lords LYNDHURST, CAMPBELL,
BROUGHAM, DIENMAN and LANGDALE,

and

expressly

overruled Regina v.

Dent, I C. & K. 97 (1843), in which
WIGHTMAN, J., had permitted a nonprofessional gentleman to testify what
was the Scotch law, from his general
familiarity with it.
The year after the decision in the
Sussex Peerage Case, two cases were decided, in both of which the manner of
the proof of foreign law was very fully
discussed, and which seem to have
settled the law on the subject for Fngland. The first of these was the Baron
de Bode's Case, 8 Ad. & E., N. S. 208
(1845). In this case it became necessary to prove the law of Alsace. A
French advocate was called, who testified that the feudal law had been abolished in Alsace, defacto, in 1789, by the
revolution, and dejure, by the treaty of
Luneville ; that a decree of the year
1789, abrogating the feudal law, existed, and that he had learned what he
testified to in the course of his legal
studies. Objection being made to this
evidence, the matter was learnedly
argued, and the judges gave their opinions seriatim. Lord DENMAN, C. J.,
went strongly on the ground of sustaining
expert testimony as to law, considered
the law as a complex resultant of statute
and interpretation, and said : "There is
another general rule: that the opinions
of persons of science must be received as
to the facts of their science. That rule
applies to the evidence of legal men ;
and I think it is not confined to unwritten law, but extends also to the
written laws which such men are bound
to know. Properly speaking, the nature
of such evidence is not to set forth the
contents of the written law, but its effect and the state of the law resulting
from it. The mere contents, indeed,
might often nqislead persons not familiar
with the particular system of law. The
witness is called upon to state what law
does result from the evidence." In the
course of his opinion Lord DENMAN
condemned Miller v. Hein~ick, as going
too far. WisLTaAs and COLERLDGr,
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JJ., agreed that the evidence was
admissible. PATTESON, J., dissented,
and stated his view of the law as follows : "I quite agree that a witness,
conversant with the law of a foreign
country, may be asked what, in his opinion, the law of that country is. But I
cannot help thinking that as soon as it
appears that he is going to speak of a
written law his mouth is closed. By the
written law, I do not mean what may be
found in a text-writer, or in the judgment of a court in any particular case,
but that which I understand to be referred to in the present case, a decree of
the supreme power of the state creating
a law in the first instance."
The other case alluded to was Earl
Nedson v. Lord Bridport, 8 Beav. 527.
In it Lord LANGDAT said: "As cases
arise in which the rights of parties litigating in English courts cannot be maintained without ascertaining, to some
extent, what is the foreign law applicable in such eases, the foreign law and its
application, like any other results of
knowledge and experience in matters of
which no knowledge is imputed to the
judge, must be proved as facts are
proved, by appropriate evidence, i. e.,
by properly qualified witnesses, who can
state from their own knowledge and experience gained by study and practice,
not only what are the words in which
the law is expressed, but also what is
the proper interpretation of those words,
and the legal meaning and effect of them
as applied to the case in question. * **
It has been made a question whether a
written law to which a witness refers
ought not to be produced and proved.
* **

II conceive it would be an advan-

tage if every law to which a witness may
refer were produced ; for although, I
think, that when it is produced, the
judge has, in general, no right to take
upon himself the business of construing
it and determining its application, yet,
when the passages are produced, they
may enable the party affected by the
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testimony, not only to cross-examine the
witness as to his own interpretation or
inferences, and the grounds thereby, but
also to call other witnesses to the same
points. * * * In the case of the Baron
de Bode, it appears to have been determined that the party was not bound to
produce a written law or decree which
his witness referred to, and the evidence
of the witness was received without the
production of the decree or law." The
position that the proof of the law rests
on the evidence of the witness, is even
more strongly stated by ERL, J., in
Cocks v. Purday, 2C. & K. 269 (1846) :
"The proper course to ascertain the
laws of a foreign country is to call a witness expert in it, and ask him, on his
responsibility, what that law is, and not
to read any fragment of a Code, which
would only mislead."
The only subsequent cases we have
been able to find are all upon the competencyof the witness. In Vanderdonclt
v. Thellusson, 19 L. J., N. S., C. P. 12
(1849), the Common Pleas admitted the
testimony of a person who had been a
stockbroker in Belgium, to prove the
Belgic law as to the presentment of a
promissory note. This case certainly
seems to go very far in the direction of
opening the doors in favor of but slightly
qualified persons as experts. It may,
however, be noted that the witness in
this case was not called to testify to the
law generally, but only as to that particular part of the law with which his
situation was supposed to have rendered
him familiar, and under which he was
presumed to have habitually acted in the
course of his own business. Still, even
with this qualification the case seems to
go very far in the direction of looseniess
of proof. In Bristow v. Sequeville, 19
L. J., N. S., Ex. 289, s. c., 5 Ex. 275
(1850), the Exchequer would not allow
the law under the Code Napoleon, in
force at Cologne, to be proved by a jurisconsult and legal adviser to the Prussian
minister, who testified that he knew the
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Code from haviag studied it at the University of Leipsic. ALDERSOx, B., distinguished this from the Baron de Bode's
Case, on the ground that, in that case
the witness had a personal knowledge of
the practice of law of Alsace. Bristow
v. Sequeville, was followed by Sir JA.ims
HANxzEN, in The Goods of Bonelli, L. R.,

1 Prob. Div. 69 (1875), and in Cartwright v. Cartwright, 26 W. R. 684
(1878), the same learned judge refused
to allow the law of Canada to be proved
by a Queen's counsel, who derived his
knowledge thereof from practicing before
the Privy Council, the ultimate court of
appeals in Canadian cases. In The
Goods of Dost Aly Khan, L. R., 6 Prob.
Div. 6 (1880), the law of Persia was to
be proved. The Persian ambassador,
at Vienna, testified, that in Persia there
were no professional lawyers, that the
administration of the law was left entirely to the ecclesiastics, and that all
persons in the diplomatic service of Persia were required to be thoroughly versed
in the law, and that, therefore, he had
studied and became acquainted with it.
He was held a competent witness.
From these cases we arrive at a conclusion as to the English rule of proof
of foreign law which we may formulate
as follows: Law is considered as something distinct from both the lex scripta
and lex non scripta. It is a combination
or resultant of both. This resultant, on
any given case involving foreign law, is
to be proved as a fact, the same as the
facts of any other science or art, that is,
the sworn testimony of persons skilled
tby
therein. These persons need not he lawyers, but they must be persons having a
practical or official knowledge of the law
of which they speak, acquired in the
place where that law is in force.
In the United States, the distinction
between the manner of proof of written
and of unwritten foreign law, was easily
taken. In Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 Johns.
Rep. 385 (1806),

SPEnCEr, J., said:

"Though courts of law will receive evi-

dence of the common law from intelligent persons of the country whose laws
are to be proved, I think there exist
strong reasons against such proof of foreign statutes ;" and in Willings v. Consequa, I Pet. C. C. 225 (1816), WAsHINGTON,

J., said : " The

written or

statute laws of foreign countries are to
be proved by the laws themselves, if they
can be procured." See also Church v.
Hubbart, 2 Cr. 187 ; Innerarity v. Mins,
I Ala. 660: Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend.
475.
It may be taken as the rule that foreign statutes cannot, in the United States
(we are now speaking of strictly foreign
statutes), be proved by parol. Though in
Frith v. Sprague, 14 Mass. 455 (1817),
the court, speaking generally, said:
"We see no other way of proving the
existence of foreign law but by oral testimony, and in American Life Ins. and
Trust Co. v. Rosenagle, 27 P. F. Smith
507 (1875), a witness was permitted to
testify as to the laws of Baden, though
his testimony involved a statute.
There have been several decisions as
to the proper certification of written evidence of the statute law of a foreign
country, and also as to the competency of
witnesses where parol testimony is admitted.
Under the first head, in Church v.
Hubbard, a copy of the law of Portugal,
certified by the United States consul at
Lisbon, under his official seal, but not
under oath, was rejected. In Jones v.
M1affett, 5 S. & R. 523 (1820), a printed
book, which an Irish barrister testified
he had received from the King's printer
as an authentic copy of Acts of Parliament for Ireland, and vWhich, he also
testified, would be received in the courtA
in Ireland as proving said acts, was received as evidence without proof of
comparison with the original acts. In
Packard v. Hill, 2 Wend. 411 (1829),
it was offered to prove by a person familiar with Cuban law, from having
practised in Cuba, that a book which he
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had purchased at a store in Havana, and
which was not proved to have been published by authority, contained the Cuban
laws upon a given subject. The book
was ruled to be incompetent evidence.
See also Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend.
173 (1829), and Hynes v. 3McDermott,
19 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 219 (1880).
In Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400 (1852),
it was held that a foreign law mak be received when it is found in a printed statute book, supported by proof that the
book has been officially published by the
government which ordained the law. In
that case a copy of the Code Civil, which
had been sent by the French government
to the Supreme Court of the United
States, was received without further
proof. See also Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me.
147 (1838).
Under the second head, as to the personal qualifications of witnesses, the
cases are few, but they do not seem to
have rendered any one competent as a
witness, except men learned in the law,
and persons whose official positions required them to be familiar with the particular law concerning which they were
called to testify: Jones v. M1affett, supra;
American Life Ins. and Trust Co. v.
Rosenayle, supra; Brush v. Wilkins, 4
J. C. R. 508.
III. Upon the question within whose
province foreign law falls after the evidence of it has been given, there is considerable difference of opinion amongst
the authorities. On the one hand it is
said that, as foreign law is, for the tribunal considering it, a mere matter of fact,
what it is must be found by the jury,
like any other fact ; on the other, that
as all law, even foreign, requires for its
intelligent and ready comprehension a
special mental training, that, therefore,
it is to be treated as a matter for construction by the judge, with the aid
of the skilled witnesses called before
him.
In England the tendency is strongly
in the former direction. In ff-ostyn v.

Farrigas,Cowp. 174 (1774), it was held
that foreign law was a question for the
jury with the assistance of the court.
In Nelson v. Bridport, supra, Lord
LANGDAL,

said that in general, even

where written law was produced, the
court had no right to take upon itself
the business of construction ; and in
the House of Lords in Di Sora v. Pitllips, 10 H. L. 624 (1863), the law
was laid down by Lord CnEL.isFoRD,
as follows: That all evidence of the
foreign law being given, the judge was
to decide not what was reasonable, but
what was the weight of the evidence,
and should not go to the foreign authorities himself. In other words, the
foreign law is a question of pure fact to
be decided by the jury, or, where there
is no jury, by what has been called "the
jury-half" of the judge. There are,
however, some cases in which, in the
case of conflict between experts in foreign law, the court has itself examined
that law: Trimbey v. Tignier, 1 Bing.
N. C. 157 (1834) ; Bremer v. Freeman,
10 Moore P. C. 306.
In the United States, while some of
the cases have followed the rule that
foreign law is for the jury as a pure
fact: De Sobry v. Laistre, 2 H. &Johns
191 (1807) ; Holman v. King, 7 Mete.
384 (1844); Ingham v. Hart, 11 Ohio
255 (1842),

(BIRCHAnD,

J., dissent-

ing) ; yet the weight of authority is the
other way. In Sidwell v. Evans, 1 P.
& W. 383 (1830),

GIBSON,

C. J.,

said: "Municipal law is a matter of
compact, and as such, the construction
of foreign statutes, as in the case of any

other written compact, belongs to the
court." A plausible distinction might be
taken in this respect between the written
and unwritten law, which necessarily
rests on parol, but it seems to have been
disregarded in Mostyn v. Farrigas [and
other cases cited by the learned chief
justice], a weight of authority more
than sufficient to bear down any argument that could be raised on a mere
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theoretic foundation, and in Bock v.
Lauman, 12 Harris 435 (1855), it is
said by LOWRIE, J. : " All the analogies of the law incline us to regard the
interpretation of foreign law, whether
written or unwritten, as falling within
the province of the court." See also
Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones Law (N. C.)
130 (1857) ; Newell v. Newell, 9 Miss.
58 (1847) ; Ripple v. Ripple, I Rawle
286 (1829); Inge v. Mitrphy, 10 Ala.
885 (1846). In Massachusetts the distinction between the written and unwritten law, with reference to the provinces of the court and the jury, seems
to be maintained, though'a somewhat
literal meaning is given to the term
written law, and it is held that, where
the evidence of foreign law consists of a
statute or a judicial opinion, the question
of construction and effect is for the court
alone: Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 254
(1868); Ely v. James, 123 Id. 36
In this connection see also
(1877).
Moore v. Guyner, 5 31e. 187 (1844).
IV. It remains to be considered how
far the general rules under the first two
heads are modified, when the foreign law
to be considered in the United States is
that of a sister state, or, in the case of a
federal court, that of one of its constituents. First, as to judicial notice.
In the first place we may notice that the
federal courts do not regard state laws
as foreign laws, but are bound to take
judicial notice of them. This rule was
laid down authoritatively by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Owings v.
STORY, J.,
Hull, 9 Pet. 607 (1835).
delivering the opinion said: "We are
of opinion that the Circuit Court was
bound to take judicial notice of the laws
of Louisiana. The Circuit Courts of
the United States are created by Congress, not for the purpose of administering the local laws of a single state alone,
but to administer the laws of all the
states in the Union in cases to which
they respectively apply. The judicial
power conferred on the general govern-

ment by the constitution extends to
many cases arising under the laws of the
different states, and this court is called
upon, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, constantly to take notice of,
and administer the jurisprudence nf all
the states. That jurisprudence is then
in no just sense, foreign jurisprudence,
to be proved to the courts of the United
States by the ordinary modes of proof
by which the laws of a foreign country
are to be established, but is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner
as the laws of the United States are
taken notice of by these courts."
As the states are, in their political relations to each other, essentially foreign
countries, it is generally held that no
judicial notice will be taken by the
courts of one state of the laws of another:
Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99 (1811); Mason v. Wash, Breese 16 (1822); State
v. Surtly, 2 Hawks. 441 (1823) ; Brackettv. Norton, 4 Conn. 517 (1823);
Ripple v. Ripple, I Rawle 386 (1829);
Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Harring. 34
(1835); Irving v. MAcLean, 4 Blackf.
5a (1835); Bryant v. Kelton, 1 Lex.
434 (1843); Pdton v. Iatner, 13 Ohio
209 (1844); Terrtt v. Woodruff, 19
Vt. 183 (1847) ; Tyler v. Trabue, 8 B.
Mon. 306 (1848); Dyer v. Smith, 12
Conn. 384 (1837); Voodrow v. O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776 (1856) ; Carey v. C.6"
C. Railroad Co., 5 Iowa 357 (1857);
Taylor v. Runyan, 9 Id.522 (1859)
Anderson v. Anderson, 23 Tex. 639
(1859); Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328
(1859); Campion v. Kille, 2 AcCart.
476 (1863); Knapp v. Abell, 10 Allen
485 (1865); Syme v. Stewart, 17 La.
Ann. 73 (1865) ; Hoyt v. McNeil, 13
Afinn. 390 (1868); Uh!er v. Semple, 5
C. E. Green 288 (1869); Drake v.
Glover, 30 Ala. 382. The law of another state must, therefore, be proved
before it can be noticed by the court:
Cases supra. It must also be pleaded,
and where a statute of another state is
pleaded it must be set out, it is not suf-
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ficient for the pleader to refer to the statute by its title and date of approval, nor
to state what, in his opinion and judgment, is its general province and effect:
Carey v. C. 6 C. Railroad Co., 5 Iowa
357 ; Ingham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255;
Hoyt v. XfcNeill, 13 Minn. 390; Irving v.
McLean, supra.
The rule is not only consistent with the
relations of the several states to each
other, but, considered from the point of
practice, is founded on common sense and
convenience. With thirty-eight states,
with their different systems of law based
in some cases on codes, in some on the
common law, with different systems of
procedure, and, above all, with thirtyeight legislatures making new laws and repealing old ones constantly, some of their
acts being doubtless grounded on the
soundest policy and manifesting the
greatest wisdom, but others being mere
experiments and guided by no systematic
reason, the condition of the judge who
was expected to be conversant with all
the modern improvements in the law of
all the states, would be indeed a hard
and pitiable one. In the language of
WOOD, J., in Pelton v. RPatner, "it is no
enviable task to keep pace with the
Solons of our own (state)," much less
so would be the task above suggested of
keeping pace with thirty-eight differing
sets of Solons. Still, the rule has not
been invariably followed, and has in
many places been modified. In Curtis
v. Martin, I Penning. (1805), PEn-mNTON, J., intimated that the Supreme
Court of New Jersey would take judicial notice of the statutes of the states
forming the Union. The remarks of the
learned judge, however, so far as they
relate to state statutes, were mere dicta
and have since been overruled. See
Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 3 Harrison 184.
In Middlebury Coll. v. Cheney, 1 Vt. 348
(1828), the court took judicial notice of
the law of Connecticut; this case, however, may be regarded as overruled by
Territt v. Woodruff, and Woodrow v.
VoL. XIX.-49

Connor, supra. In Tennessee, at a very
early day, the position was broadly
taken, that the court would take judicial
notice of the laws of sister states. This
was held in Foster v. Taylor, 2 Overt.
191 (1812), in the face of argument that
such notice ought not to be taken, and
this has continued to be the law of the
state-see Coffee v. Neely, 2 Heisk. 311
(1871) ; Hobbs v. Railroad, 9 Id. 873
(1873), though since the adoption of the
Code, this assumption of judicial knowledge seems to be confined to the Supreme
Court, while the law is required to be
proved in inferior tribunals. In Paine
v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411
(1876), the court took judicial notice of
the law of New York. The above cases
may be regarded as in direct conflict with
the general rule; they are not numerous
and hardly weaken its favor; but the
principles of the cases wherein the rule
has been modified, if carried to a legitimate conclusion, would detract very
much from its generality in effect. It
has been held that where a state recognises acts done in pursuance of the laws
of another state, the courts of the first
state should take judicial cognisance of
the said laws so far as may be necessary
to judge of the acts alleged to be done
under them: Carpenter v. Dexter, 8
Wall. 513 (1869), and that where a statute of another state has been properly
brought to the notice of the court, it will,
in all future cases, take notice of that
statute and presume the law of the foreign state to be the same until its change
is shown: Graham v. Williams, 21 La.
Ann. 594 (1869). Some cases hold
that the courts will notice the constitutions of sister states: Butcher v. Bank,
2 Kans. 70 (1863); Dodge v. Coffin,-15
Id. 277 (1875) ; Curtisv. Afartin, supra
(but query whether the opinion in Van
Buskirk v. Mlock overrules this case as to
foreign constitutions as well as statutes).
It is also held that courts will take notice
of the jurisdiction of courts in other
states: Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill. 577
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(1856), and that a court will take notice
that the basis of the law of a sister state
is the common law of England : Young
v. Tenzpleton, 4 La. Ann. 254 (1849) ;
Copley v. Sanford, 2 Id. 355 (1847).
The case of the State of Ohio v. flinchman, 27 Penn. St. 479 (1856), isexceptional in its character. In it, it was
held that a state court, when its judgment would be liable to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States In
a case arising under the law of a sister
state, would take judicial notice 9f such
law. In delivering the opinion of the
,nJ., said: "A judgcourt, WooDw
ment of this court arising out of the
federal constitution and legislation would
be reviewable in the Supreme Court of
the United States, and there the states
of the confederacy are not regarded as
foreign states whose laws and usages
must be proved, but as domestic institutions, whose laws are to be noticed
without pleading or proof. It would be
a very imperfect and discordant administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision
while the court of final resort was controlled by another; and hence it follows
that in a question of this sort we should
take notice of the local laws of a sister
state in the same manner as the Supreme
Court of the United States would do on
a writ of error to a judgment." This
case has been severely criticised in Rape
v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328 (1859), PAYNE,
J., said: "It does not follow that the
United States Supreme Court would be
entitled to hold that the states occupy the
same relation to each 6ther that they do to
the federal government or that it does to
them. And if they do not, and the
court of Pennsylvania was not bound
to take judicial notice of the laws of
Ohio, but in the absence of any proof
on the subject, was entitled to presume
them to be in accordance with its own,
it would seem that the Appellate Court,
in reviewing its decision, should act upon
the rule by which the state court was an-

thorized to decide. And if by this rule
there was any failure in executing the
judgment according to the laws of Ohio,
it should be held to arise from the default of the party relying on the record
in not producing to the state court the
necessary proofs as to what those laws
were, and not from any denial of a right
secured by the constitution and laws of
Congress."
Second. As to the method of the proof
of the law of a sister state. It may be
stated, as a rule, that a statute of another state will not be allowed to be
proved by parol: McDeed v. AMcDeed,
67 flI. 545 (1873) ; Isabella v. Pecot, 2
La. Ann. 387 ; Comparet v. Jernegan, 5
Blackf. 375 (1840) ; Emery v. Berry,
28 N. H. 486 (1854); Raynham v.
Canton, 3 Pick. 293 (1825) ; Bryant v.
Kelton, 1 Tex. 434, though the evidence
of experts has been admitted to show the
law of another state, in some cases, even
where a statute and its construction were
involved : Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones
Law 130; Barknanv. Hopkins, 6 Eng.
(Ark.) 157 (1850) ; and it is held that
where parol evidence of the law of a
state is offered, it will be received in the
absence of proof that the law spoken of
is a statute law, and that if it appears
in the Appellate Court that the law was
statute, the judgment will not be reversed
on account of the admission of evidence:
Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. 84
(1826).
In the earliest reported case on the
subject of the proof of state statute law.
yThonpson v. Musser, I Dall. 458 (1789),
to prove a statute of Virginia, a book
was offered bearing the imprint, "Acts
passed at a General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia; Richmond,
printed by John Dunlap and James
Hayes, Printers to the Commonwealth."
The Common Pleas refused to receive
the book, and its judgment was on that
account reversed. In the Supreme Court,
McKEAN, C. J., said: "I admit that
this printed copy of an Act of Assem-
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bly, thoug- it purports to have been Rice, 12 S. & RI. 203 (1824), a printed
printed by the law printers of Virginia, book was offered and an objection was
is not as good evidence as a sworn copy made, that an act of the legisl'ture of
compared with the rolls or an exemplifi- another state must be authenticated accation under the great seal, but these cording to the Act of Congress of 1790,
modes of authentication are likewise in- before it could be received in evidence.
ferior to the original law itself. If the The court, however, overruled the objecplaintiff in error had been sued in Vir- tion and its action was affirmed by the Suginia, this printed book of the Acts of preme Court (then composed of TILGHAssembly would then, unquestionably, mAx, C. J., GiBsoN and DUNCAN, JJ.),
have been good evidence; and I can dis- the Chief Justice regarding the question
cover no satisfactory reason why, as he of admissibility as almost too plain for
is sued here, the same evidence should argument. In Ranham v. Canton, 3
not be received at least pimafacie. * **
Pick. 293 (1825), PARKER, C. J., said:
Although the general principle and rule " We concur with the courts of Pennsylof evidence is, 'that the best evidence vania and some other states, and the
the nature of things will admit shall be courts of the United States, in holding
given,' yet, by constant practice and al- that a volume purporting on its face to
lowance of the judges, the rule is fre- contain the laws of a sister state is adquently dispensed with, * * * though missible as primafacie evidence to prove
the practice of the courts or forms of the statute law of that state. The conpleading which pass sub silentio do not nection, intercourse and constitutional
make the law; yet, in a case like the ties which bind together the several states
present, a constant practice of permitting require that these species of*evidence
Acts of Assembly or laws to be read out should be sufficient until contradicted."
of printed books without opposition, is It may be stated, as a rule obtaining in
a great evidence of the law; and such most of the states, that a printed hook
printed copies, being of public notoriety purporting or proved to contain the statand relied on as genuine, have the pre- ute laws of another state, will be adsumption of authority in their favor and mitted in the absence of contradiction.
afford a reasonable satisfaction to the See, in addition to the above cases,
mind of their truth and accuracy. * * * United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that (1806) ; State v. Stade, I D. Chip. 303
the court below erred in the rejection of
(1814); Towry v. Bank of Alexandria,
the evidence in question, and for that 4 Cr. 3; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois,
7
cause only the judgment ought to be Mon. 585 (1828); Taylor's Adm'r. v.
reversed." BnYAx i id RusH, JJ., Bank, 5 Leigh 471 (1834); Allen v.
concurred, the latter saying: " Every Watson, 2 -ill (S. C.) 319 (1834); Hancountry has a right to promulgate the rick v. Andrews, 9 Port. (Ala.) 9
laws as it pleases, and whatever printed (1839); Mullen v. M1orris, 2 Barr 85
authorities are received in a foreign (1845); Territt v. Woodrnf, supra;
country as evidence of its laws are, in Ronery v. Berry, supra; Compare v.
my opinion, evidence of the same laws Jernegan, supra; Clarke v. Bank, 5
to court and jury in Pennsylvania."
Eng. 519 (1850) ; Whitesides v. Poole,
ATrmE, J., dissented. This decision 9 Rich. 68 (1855) ; State v. Abbey, 29
was made before the passage of the Act Vt. 60 (1856): Simns v. Southern Exof Congress providing for the authenti- press Co., 38 Ga. 129 (1868); McDeed
cation of records, but the conclusion ar- v. McDeed, supra; People v. Calder,
rived at therein has been maintained in 30 Mich. 85 (1874); People v. Lambert,
cases subsequent to the act. In Kean v. 5 Id. 349; Inge v. Murphy. 10 Ala.
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885 (1846).
In some states, as Connecticut, see Hale v. N. J. Steam Nav.
Co., 15 Conn. 539, the admission of this
species of evidence is provided for by
Act of Assembly; in others, as New
York, see Code, sect. 942, by their codes
of practice.
There is, however, a line of authority
in opposition to the rule. At the head
of this line stands The State v. Twitty,
2 Hawks 441 (1823). In that case the
court held that the printed statute book
of Virginia could not be received as evidence of the laws of that state, and that
the Act of Congress providing for the
authentication of records must be followed in the case of the statute of another state, TAYLOR, C. J., saying: "It
is admitted that in point of fact it would
be a matter of great convenience, to admit the printed statutes of those states
which conflict with this. * * * But the
rule which admits such evidence as to one
state must satisfy its competency as to all
fhe states, however remote from or unconnected with us in social or commercial intercourse, and this would certainly
open a door for fraud and imposition."
The law in North Carolina, afterwards,
however, was altered by statute, and the
statute of a sister state may there be
proved by a copy authenticated by the
secretary of the state of which the statute is a law: Rev. Cod. N. C. 44, sect. 3.
In Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Harring.
34 (1835), a printed volume taken from
the office of the secretary of the state
of Delaware, who had received it from
the state whose laws it professed to contain in the usual course of exchange of
statute books amongst the states, was
offered in evidence to prove a law contained in it. It was rejected. CLAYTON, C. J., said: "There
are but two
modes of authenticating statutes under
the common law ; by sworn copies or by
attestation under seal. One of these
must be followed or the legislature must
provide another."
In Packard v. Eill, 2 Wend. 411

(1829), SAVAGE, C. J., stated the New
York rule of his day to be: "The written
laws of other states must be proved by
an exemplification and not by the printed
statute books of such state."
This rule
has, however, been changed by the Code,
and printed copies purporting or proved
to have been published by authority of
the state whose laws they profess to contain or proved to be commonly admitted
in evidence in the judicial tribunals of
said state, are now admissible in the
courts of New York.
In Hueston v. Jones, 2 La. Ann. 937
(1847), a copy of statutes alleged to
have been printed by authority, was rejected, but in fakeman v. M3arquand, 5
Mart. N. S. (La.( 271 (1826) such a book
lent from the office of the secretary of
state and proved to have been sent to
Louisiana by the executive of New York,
was admitted to prove the laws of that
state.
In Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 3 Harrison
184 (1640), a printed statute book to
which was attached the certification nder
seal, of the secretary of state of New
York, that the book was a correct copy
of the statutes of that state was offered,
supported by the testimony of a member
of the New York bar that the book was
received and read in the New York courts
as authority. On cross-examination, the
witness said that he had not compared
the book with the original statutes, and
that he could not say whether the book
did or did not contain any repealed statutes. It was held that the book could
not be given in evidence. HoNxBLOwER,
C. J., said: "The statutes, public and
private, must be proved by copies authenticated and examined pursuant t( the
Act of Congress, or, at least, by sworn
copies from the original statutes."
A digest, though one usually received
without objection in the state whose laws
it contains, will not be received in another state: Phillips v. Murphy, 2 La.
Ann. 654; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wise.
328.
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The common law of a sister state may
be shown by expert testimony: Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick. 293; Tyler v.
Trabue, 8 B. Mon. 306 ; Dougherty v.
Snyder, 11 S. & R. 84; and it is practically held in some cases that what may
be called the resultant law, i. e., the law
considered as a compound of statute and
interpretation thereof in connection with
the common law maybe so proved also:
Barkman v. Hopkins, 6 Eng. 157;
Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones Law 130;
Danforth v. Reynolds, 1 Vt. 265; Dyer
v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384; see contra,
McDeed v. McDeed, 67 IM. 545. In
some cases it is held that the common
law may be proved by the reports of the

state whose law is in question: Billingsley
v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331 ; Kline v. Baker,
99 Mass. 254; Ely v. James, 123 Mass.
36; Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885;
Hale v. New Jersey Nay. Co., 15 Conn.
589 ; in New York it is provided by the
Code that the reports shall be presumptive
evidence of the common law of theit
state. In some cases where the reports
were not directly received as evidence,
the same result was reached by the court
examining them for the purpose of construing the foreign law : Ripple v. Ripple,
1 Rawle 386; Terrltt v. Woodruff, 19
Vt. 183; and this even where the construction of a statute was in question.
HENRY BuDD, JR.

Court of Appeas of Maryland.
STONEBRAKER v. ZOLLICKOFFER ET AL.
A storm of wind blew down a quantity of timber growing on a farm, and the
same was converted into cooper stuff and firewood, and sold by the trustee. On a
bill filed by the tenant for life claiming the net proceeds of the sales made by the trustee, together with all interest which the same might have earned from the time it was
received by him, or a reasonable time thereafter: Held, that to the extent of the
amount of the net proceeds of sale realized for firewood, the complainant was entitled to the corpus of the fund, but as to the amount realized for the timber, he was
entitled only to the interest during his life.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Washington county, in
Equity.
By the will of Samuel Stonebraker a certain farm lying in
Washington county, was devised to Henry F. Zollickoffer, in trust
for the testator's son, George M. Stonebraker. In August 1873,
a storm of wind blew down a large quantity of timber growing on
this farm, and the same was converted into cooper stuff and firewood, and sold by the trustee. A bill of complaint was filed by
George M. Stonebraker, claiming the net proceeds of the sales
made by the trustee (about $1600) together with all interest which
the same might have earned from the time it was received by him,
or a reasonable time thereafter. The trustee and the husband of
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one of the complainant's sisters answered that complainant had
only a life-estate, and was not therefore entitled to the money.
The following opinion was delivered in the Circuit Court by
ALVEY, J. (After reciting the facts and construing the will.)-

I conclude, therefore, that George M. Stonebraker takes but an
equitable life-estate in the farm devised, subject to the condition
and option therein mentioned; and if there were no children in
being at the time of the devise, the devise to them operated by way
of contingent remainder, which became vested upon the birth of
the first child, subject to open and let in after-born children.
Such being the right and estate of George M. Stonebraker, the
plaintiff, the next question is, what interest has he in the fund
produced by the sale of the timber and wood from the farm ?
Timber as such belongs to the inheritance. Tenant for life,
unless he holds without impeachment of waste (which is not the
case here), has no right to fell timber, except for necessary and
proper repairs of the buildings and erections on the premises.
And where timber has been blown down by wind, or severed by
accidental cause, or has been cut down by a wrongdoer, it belongs
to the party who has, at the time of severance, the first estate of
inheritance. This was ruled in Bowles's Case, 11 Co. 79, and the
principle has been acted upon in many subsequent cases. And
where timber has been so severed, the fund arising from the sale of
it, the court will order to be invested for the benefit of the estatethat is, the inheritance; and, according to the later cases, though
otherwise in some of the earlier ones, the tenant for life, though he
may be subject to impeachment for waste, if free from blame in
respect to the particular timber severed, will be allowed to receive
the interest of the fund for life. This is the settled rule in cases
where the timber is cut by order of court for the benefit of the
estate; and it has been decided that the reason and justice of the
rule equally apply to the case where the timber has been severed
by tempest, accident, or trespass, if the tenant for life be without
fault: Tooker v. Annesley, 5 Sim. 235; Waldo v. Waldo, 7 Id.
261; Bateman v. Hotchkin, 31 Beav. 486; Bagot v. Bagot, 82
Id. 509. The tenant for life being entitled to the interest of the
fund in the one case, it is difficult to perceive any good reason why
he should not be entitled in the other; as in both cases he is equally
deprived of the possible benefits that the trees might be to the use
and enjoyment of his term, and that, too, without his fault.
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But though the tenant for life may not be entitled either to the
timber or the corpus of the fund arising from its sale, yet he is
entitled to the old trees which cannot be used as timber, and to th
tops and branches of trees which have been felled for timber, and
also to the regular thinnings and trimmings of the trees in the
woods; and these he may convert into firewood, or to any other
use that he can make of them : Rerlakenden's Case (3d resol.),
4 Co. 62; Channon v. Patch, 5 B. & 0. 897. Here, while the
fund in question is alleged to have arisen from the sale of timber
and wood, it is not alleged, nor shown in proof, what part of the
fund was produced by the sale of timber, and what part from the
sale of wood. Upon the supposition that nothing was converted
into firewood that was valuable as timber, it will be necessary that the
amount realized for the wood be separately ascertained; as to that
extent the complainant is entitled to the corpus of the fund; but
as to the amount realized for the timber he is entitled only to the
interest thereon during his life.
Unless this ascertainment be made by agreement, I shall refer the
case to the auditor to take an account, but if an agreement can be
made to obviate the reference, I will then sign a decree in conformity to the principles of this opinion, with directions that the costs
be paid out of the fund arising from the sale of the timber, as was
done in the case of Tooker v. Anneslek], 5 Sim. 235.
To obviate the reference to the auditor, it was agreed by the parties through their respective counsel, that the sum of five dollars
should be taken and considered as the value of the firewood; the
court thereupon adjudged that the complainant was entitled to five
dollars, the value, as agreed upon, of so much of the trees as were
converted into firewood, and that the net amount of the proceeds
of sale, after deducting the said sum of five dollars, should be held
by the trustee, and the interest thereof paid annually to the complainant during his lifetime, according to the discretion vested in
such trustee by the will.
From this decree the complainant appealed.
Julian J. Alexander, for appellant.
H. K. Douglass, for respondent.
The opinion of this court was delivered by
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BARTOL, C. J.-The branch of the case relating to the timber
is rested upon the opinion of the judge sitting in the Circuit Court,
and need not be further discussed.
Decree affirmed.
The question involved in this case has
not often been decided, and one is perhaps more surprised that any direct precedents can be produced, than that those
precedents should be few.
There are a good many cases upon the
kindred questions which have often come
up for decision in England, whether life
tenant has any title to a fund derived
from (1st) timber wrongfully cut down,
or (2d) timber felled by order of court.
That timber which has been wrongfully
cut down belongs to the party who has
the first estate of inheritance is well settled, and in that case the reversioner
(or lessor, as the case may be), would be
entitled to the whole fund derived from
the sale of it, and the life-tenant (or
lessee) could have no claim even to the
interest of the fund: Lushington v. Boldero, 15 Beav. 1. Sir Jome ROmILLY,
M. R. : "The equitable doctrine applicable to this and other similar cases is
this : that no person shall obtain any
advantage of his own wrong. But it is
manifest that the tenant for life may obtain very considerable advantage from
his own wrong, if he were to cut down
timber and obtain the interest of the
fund ; his income for life would thereby
be increased beyond what it would have
been if the timber had not been cut."
It is equally well settled that where timber has been cut by order of court, that
is to say, when the court has ordered the
thinning of a wood within proper limits
for the purpose of improving the rest of
the trees, the proceeds of sale must be
invested and the interest paid to the lifetenant: Wickham v. Wickham, 19 Ves.
419 ; Tooker v. Annesley, 5 Sim. 235 ;
Waldo v. Waldo, 7 Id. 261 ; Bagot v.
Bagot, 32 Beav. 509. The earlier case
of Bewick v. Whitfield, 3 P. Wins. 266,
may be regarded as overruled by Wick-

ham v. Vickham, in which case Sir SAMUEL ROMILLr, in argument, referring to
the earlier case, said "the court was not
then in the habit of laying out the money
produced" from sale of timber.
The principal case presents the question whether lifc-tenant is entitled to the
interest of a fund derived from -timber
blown down by a storm, and the leurned
judge decides that "the reason and justice of the rule (as to timber severed by
order of court) equally apply to the case
of -' windfalls," a decision which will
doubtless meet with general approval.
Besides the " reason and justice" of the
thing, this application of the rule has a
recent and direct authority to rest on :
Bateman v. Hotclcn, 31 Beav. 486, cited
in the decision. ! the early case, Duke
of Newcastle v. Vane (cited in Whitfield
v. Bewit, 2 P. NVms.
240, and apparently
alluded to in Bewick v. Whitfield, 3 P.
Wims. 267), where "great quantities of
timber were blown down in a storm,"
the contrary was decided, that is to say,
the timber was decreed to belong to the
remainderman, although there were tenants for life. These two cases are apparently the only ones on the precise
question presented by the principal case.
Evidently the point does not come up
except where a large quantity of timber
is blown down, that is to say, enough to
make it worth while to consider, not only
who is entitled to the corpus of the fund,
but who is entitled to the interest. There
are in the books a good many statements
of the law to the effect that remainderman and not life-tenant is entitled to
trees blown down (see for instance,
Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 62; Bowles's
Case, 11 Co. 79), but these statements
are made illustratively for the most part,
and are meant to negative life-tenant's
claim to the corpus or to the whole fund,
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which ordinarily would not be large
enough to cause dispute about an investment of it. See even the recent case of
Honywood v. Honywood, 43 L. J. Ch.
652 (1874) ; but any such statement of

the law (which, in this case, was obiter),
must now be considered as made subject
to the very reasonable qualification which
Bateman v. Hotcldcin introduced.
F. J. B.
Baltimore.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
RICHARDSON v. SNIDER.
The party suing upon bills of exchange must show in his pleadings title in himself,
and an averment that the plaintiffs "are successors in and to (payee's) business,
and as such are the legal and bonajide holders of the bill of exchange," is not a sufficient allegation of title.
Where one partner retires, but the others continue to do business in the same firm
name, the retiring partner is only obliged to give actual notice to parties with whom
the firm has directly dealt.
- This rule does not extend to require notice to the successor in business of a creditor
with whom the firm has had dealings, although such successor may have been a clerk
in his predecessor's employ, and as such acquired knowledge of who composed the
other firm, and after his succession to the business may have continued to deal with
the firm under the impression that the retired partner was still a member of it.

ACTION on bills of exchange and a book account.
sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The case is

McConnell & Tully, for appellant, cited Edwards on Bills and
Notes, 2 ed., 237; Archer v. Spencer, 3 Blkf. 405; Harter v.
.- llis, 6 Id. 154; Wade on Notice, sects. 502, 508-513; Vernon
v. Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 183; Clapp v. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 283;
TFardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. S. C. 549; Parsons on Partnership
428.
Magee & Jacks, for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The first and second paragraphs of the complaint

of the appellees are founded upon bills of exchange drawn by Louis
Snider, and accepted by the firm of Smith & Hall, of which it is
alleged all the appellants were members. Demurrers were unsuccessfully addressed to each of these paragraphs, and appellants
complain of the action of the court in overruling them.
VOL. XXTX--50
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The contention of the appellants is, that the complaint does not
show any title in the appellees to the bills of exchange sued on,
and that no right in appellees to maintain an action thereon is
shown by the complaint. The allegations of title are essentially
the same in both paragraphs, and are as follows: That said Louis
Snider is deceased, and that the appellees " are his successors in
and to his business, and as such are the legal and bonafide holders
of the bill of exchange." There is no allegation that Louis Snider
was a partner of the appellees, nor is the claim of appellees based
upon the ground that they are surviving partners.
It is a familiar rule of pleading that a complaint or declaration
must show title: Jaccard v. Anderson, 32 Mo. 188; Stephens
P1. 87. The plaintiff, in an action upon a bill of exchange or
promissory note, must show a right in himself to maintain an action
thereon: Archer v. Spencer, 3 Blkf. 405; Reed et al. v. Garr et
al., 59 Ind. 299; Barcus v. Evans, 14 Id. 381; Bousch v. Duff,
35 Mo. 312.
The allegation in the complaint under examination is a peculiar
one. It does assert, generally, that the appellees are the bonafide
holders of the bill, but it expressly limits and restricts this general
statement, by specifically showing that they are such holders, because they are the successors in business of Louis Snider. This is
the only effect that can be given to the allegation that they are his
successors in business, and as such, the holders of the bill. The
ownership, they assert, is such, and such only, as the fact of their
being the successors in business of Louis Snider confers upon them.
The nature of their title is specifically stated, and the specific statement of title is the one which must govern: Reynolds v. Copeland
(this term). The facts given as constituting the foundation of the
claim of title are not sufficient to support it. A man, by becoming
the successor in business of another, does not become the owner of
bills of exchange of which that other died possessed. The facts,
which affirmatively appear upon the face of the complaint, so far
from showing title in the appellees, show that, in truth, they had
none whatever. All that the allegations of the complaint upon
this point substantively assert is, Louis Snider died the owner of
the bills, and that the appellee succeeded to his business. In the
form in which it is expressed, the statement that appellees are the
owners, is merely a conclusion of law drawn by the pleader from
the two facts, Snider's death and their succession to his business.
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Clearly enough these facts do not warrant the conclusion of ownership by the appellees of the bills declared on. The demurrers
ought to have been sustained.
The third paragraph of the complaint is upon an account for
goods sold and delivered to the firm of Hall & Smith, of which all
the appellants are alleged to have been members. Upon this paragraph of the complaint an instruction was based by the trial court
of which the appellants, Richardson and Annabel, complain. By
their motion for a new trial, by their assignment of errors, and in
their brief, these appellants insist that the first instruction given to
the jury was erroneous. In order that the force of the instruction
complained of may be understood it is necessary to give a brief
synopsis of the evidence touching the point upon which the instruction bears. Smith, Hall, Richardson and Annabel had been partners, but in November 1875 the partnership was dissolved, Richardson and Annabel retiring, and a notice of dissolution published in
the newspapers, but the business was continued, without any change
oif the firm name, by Smith and Hall. The firm of Smith & Hall,
prior to November 1875, had dealt with Louis Snider, but had
never dealt with.the firm of Louis Snider's Sons. Louis Snider was
represented in his dealings with Smith & Hall prior to the withdrawal of Richardson and Annabel by some of the appellees, but
they were not, however, associated with him as partners, but simply as agents. The goods described in the third paragraph were
sold after the dissolution of the partnership which had existed between the appellants and the withdrawal of Richardson and Annabel from the firm of Smith & Hall. The instruction under mention
is somewhat lengthy and confused, and it need not be copied, as the
legal proposition which it asserts can be stated in a condensed form.
It declares, in substance, that if any of the appellees, as agents of
Louis Snider, had acquired knowledge from the dealings of Smith
& Hall with Louis Snider that Richardson and Annabel were members of that firm, and goods were sold to said firm of Smith & Hall
after the withdrawal of Richardson and Annabel, the latter were
liable unless they had shown that the firm of Louis Snider's Sons
had actual notice of the dissolution of the firm of Smith & Hall
and the withdrawal of Richardson and Annabel. This instruction
was erroneous. Richardson and Annabel were bound to give actual
notice only to those with whom the firm of Smith & Hall had previously dealt. No dealings at all had ever been had by Smith &
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Hall with the firm of Louis Snider's Sons, and the retiring partners were under no obligation to give them notice. It cannot be
held that because some of the agents of Louis Snider knew who
composed the original firm of Smith & Hall, that when they, the
agents, established an entirely new firm they were entitled to notice
of dissolution. Certainly this would not be seriously contended if
the agents of Louis Snider had gone to some distant city and there
formed a new partnership, and yet the principle is precisely the
same. Nor could it be seriously insisted that each of the agents
would have been entitled to actual notice if there had been a
separation and each had gone into a new and distinct firm. The
rule requiring notice to those with whom the firm has previously
dealt does not require actual notice to be given to persons with
whom the firm had never directly dealt, although such persons
may have been the clerks or salesmen of one with whom the firm
did have previous dealings. This must be the rule, or else it must
follow that it would be the duty of persons retiring from a firm to
give actual notice to clerks, salesmen, bookkeepers and every one
else who had been in the service of one with whom the firm had
previously dealt, and who had acquired knowledge through such
service of the members of the partnership. The rule as to actual
notice does not require that it shall be given to those who as agents
represent the person with whom the firm deals, but that it shall be
given to the principal. In no just sense can it be said that the
dealing is with the agent, for the act of the agent is that of his
Judgment reversed at costs of appellees.
principal.
I. It is a fundamental rule of pleading that the plaintiff must allege his title
in his pleading to the chose in action:
Stephen on Pleading 304.
The following allegations to show title
to choses in action have been held good:
That the note was payable to the order
of A., the defendant, who endorsed it in
blank and transferred it to the plaintiff:
Mitchell v. Eyde, 12 How. Pr. 460;
that th note was made by the defendant
payable to his own order, and by him
endorsed and delivered to one A. for a
valuable consideration ; and that the
plaintiff is now the bondfide holder and
owner of the same: Holstein v. Rice, 15

How. Pr. I ; that the defendant made
the note whereby he promised to pay a
certain sum to the plaintiff or his oler,
on demand, and delivered the sainq to
plaintiff: Niblo v. Harrison, 7 Abt. Pr.
447 ; that the defendant made his note
payable and delivered it to A., who thereupon endorsed the same to the plaintiff:
Appleby v. .Elkins, 2 Sand. S. C. 673;
that the defendant made his note payable
to the order of A., and the same "was
duly endorsed by the payee and transferred to the plaintiff," and that thus
the defendant was justly indebted to the
plaintiff: Taylorv. Corbiere, 8 How. Pr.
385 ; "that the said note endorsed be-
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tore the maturit. thereof, and for value
received, lawfully came into the possession of these plaintiffs:" Lee v.
Ainslie, 4 Abt. Pr. 463 ; a. c., 1 Hilton
277 ; that the contract in writing became the property of the plaintiff by
purchase: Prinde v. Caruthers, 15 N.
Y. 425; s. C., 10Yow. Pr. 33; that
the defendant made and delivered the
note to the payee, "who then and there
endorsed it and delivered it so endorsed,
and thereafter, and before maturity, the
same came lawfully into the possession
of these plaintiffs for value :" Phelps v.
Ferguson, 19 How. Pr. 143; s. C., 9
Abt. Pr. 206; when the complaint furnishes a copy of the note sued on, it is
not necessary to aver a delivery to the
plaintiff, who is the payee: LaFayette
Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 30 Barb. 491 ; that
the defendant, by his note, promised to
pay A., or order, and that the plaintiff,
(B.,) "is now the lawful owner and
holder of said note :" Genet v. Sayre,
12 Abt. Pr. 347 ; that the defendants
drew the check sued on, and that it was
afterwards transferred and delivered to
the plaintiffs, whereby they became and
are the owners thereof: Mechanics' Bank
v. Straiton, 36 How. Pr. 190; in a suit
against the maker of the note, a complaint that sets forth a copy, and alleges
a sum due thereon from the defendant to
the plaintiff, although the note is by its
terms payable to a third person, and
there is no allegation of an endorsement
by him: Continental Bank v. Bramhall,
10 Bosw. 595; Conkling v. Gandall, 1
Keyes 228; in an action on a note
against the maker, the complaint alleged
several endorsements, but not one to the
plaintiffs, but alleged that they "are
now the lawful owners and holders"
thereof, held good: Reeve v. Fraker, 32
Wis. 243; that the note was delivered
to another for the plaintiff, and that it
is held and owned by him is good:
Camden Bank v. Rodgers, 4 How. Pr.
63; a. c., 2 Code R. 45 ; that the plaintiff
thm owner of the note and mortgage

sued upon: Bollins v. Forbes, 10 Cal
299.
In the following cases held to be in
sufficient to show title in plaintiff; that
the plaintiff is the "lawful holder" of
the note: Beach v. Gallup, 2 Code R. (N.
Y.) Rep. 66; so setting forth only a
copy of the note and endorsement, by
which it does not appear that the plaintiff is a party either to the note or endorsements, and averring that the amount
is due the plaintiff: Lord v. Cheseborough, 4 Sandf. 696; so an averment
that the paper came into the hands of the
plaintiff by purchase for value, and that
he is now the legal owner and holder of
it: Burrall v. Bushwick Railroad Co., 75
N. Y. 218.
The decision of the New York courts
was upon the 142d section of the Code,
viz.: The complaint shall contain: " I.
The title of the cause, specifying the
name of the court in which the action is
brought, the name of the county in which
the plaintiff desires the trial to be had,
and the names of the parties to the
action, plaintiff and defendant. 2. A
plain and concise statement of the facts
constituting a cause of action without
unnecessary repetition. 3. A demand
of the relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If recovery of
money be demanded the amount thereof
shall be stated."
II. Upon the question of the liability
ofa retiring partner to those who continue
to deal with the firm without actual notice
of his retirement, though the general
principle is everywhere recognised, there
is some discrepancy in its application to
particular states of fact.
In Lyon v. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1,the
defendants, &c., had been partners previous to March 1857, when they dissolved partnership and gave notice of
such dissolution by publication in a newspaper of the town where they did business. One of the partners continued the
business, and in the fall of 1857, bought
coal of the plaintiffs, which the latter

RICHARDSON v. SNIDER.
sold, with no knowledge of the dissolution and on the credit of the partnership.
The plaintiffs had sold coal in one instance to the defendants before dissolution, which was the only dealing that they
had had with them, but the defendants
had been regular customers of a firm
which sold coal at the same place, and
to which the plaintiff had succeeded, the
former firm having consisted of one of
the plaintifs, and one A., and the present firm of the same plaintiff, and one
B., who had for some years been a clerk
of the former firm. It was held that the
plaintiffs were to be regarded as having
had "former dealings" with the defendants, and that they could be affected only
by actual notice ; also held that the lapse
of time between the dissolution and the
purchase of the coal-the fact that the
plaintiffs were doing business in the same
town with the defendants-and the fact
that an advertisement of the plaintiffs
stood next to the advertisement of the
dissolution in the newspapers-although
to be considered in determining whether
the plaintiffs had actual notice, were of
no avail in law against the fact that they
had no actual knowledge of the dissolution. So where a partnership is dissolved by the voluntary act of the partners, and not by operation of law, reasonable notice must be given to the public,
and until it is actually so given, the
partner remains liable as such to any
person, although not a former dealer
with the firm, who may thereafter enter
into a contract within the scope of the
partnership business, with either of the
partners in the name and upon the credit
of the partnership, without actual knowledge of the dissolution. And it makes
no difference that there has not been
time to give such notice, or that for any
reason it was not practicable to give it:
Morton v. Searles, 28 Conn. 43; Mechanics' Bank v. Livingston, 33 Barb.
458. As to time to give notice see
Bristolv. Sprague, 8 Wend. 423; Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. 552.

In order to exonerate the members of
a firm from liability upon a promissory
note made in its name after its diksolnti6n, by one of the partners for the accommodation of a third person, and
taken in good f.itlt and for value by one
not a dealer with the firm, but having
knowledge of its prior existence, and
not of its dissolution, it is necessary
that there should be actual notice to the
party to be affected : City Bank of Brooklyn v. .McChesney, 20 N. Y. 240; Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U. S. 430.
Subsequent dealers with the continuing firm without notice, who had no dealings with the old firm: Shamburg v.
Ruggies, 83 Pa. St: 148 ; Gaar v. Huggins, 12 Bush 259; Kennedy v. Bohannon, 11 B. Mon. 119; Treadwell v.
Wells, 4 Cal. 260 ; Chamberlainv. Dow,
10 Mich. 319; Dickinson v. Dickinson,
25 Gratt. 321; Newcomet v. Bretzman,
69 Pa. St. 785; Ayrault v. Chamberlin,
26 Barb. 89.
Liability of a retired partner to one
dealing with the remainder of the firm
and who had no notice of such retirement: Parkin v. Carruthers, 3 Esp.
248; Williams v. Keats, 2 Stark. 257 ;
Brown v. Leonard, 2 Chitty 120; Stables
v. Eley, I Car. & P. 614 (tort) ; Farrar
v. Deflinne, 1 Car. & K. 580 (a dormant
partner); Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp.
89; Carter v. Whalley, I B. & Ad.
14; Graham v. Hope, Peake 154; Johnson v. Totten, 3 Cal. 343 ; Williams v.
Bowers, 15 Id. 321 ; Page v. Brant,
18 Ill. 37 ; Ennis v. Williams, 30 Geo.
691; Lowe v. Penny, 7 La. Ann. 356;
Skannel v. Taylor, 12 Id. 773 ; Reilly
v. Smith, 16 Id. 31 ; Zorlar v. Janvrin,
47 N. H. 324; Vernov. Manhattan Co.,
17 Wend. 524; Conro v. Port Henry
Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27 ; Fettrech v.
Armstrong, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 339 ; Williams v. Birch, 6 Bosw. 299 ; Little v.
Clarke, 36 Pa. St. 114; White v. Murphy, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 369; Hutchins v.
Hudson, 8 Humph. 426; Kirkman v.
Snodgrass, 3 Head. 370; Tudor v.
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White, 27 Tex. 584; Prentiss v. Sindair, 5 Vt. 149 ; &ntherin v. Grain,
67 Ill. 106; Speer Y. Bishop, 24 Ohio
St. 598 ; Kenny v. Atwater, 77 Pa. St.
34 ; Carmichaelv. Greer, 55 Geo. 116 ;
Holtgreve v. Wintker, 85 Ill. 470; Aus-
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tin v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 571 ; Freeman
v. Falconer, 12 J. & Sp. (N. Y.) 142;
Exparte Burton, 1 G. & J. 207 ; Pratt
v. Page, 32 Vt. 13; Ex parte Leaf, 1
Deacon 176.
W. W. T.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
JOHN OSBORNE v. CHARLES H. MORGAN ET AL.
A servant can maintain an action against a fellow-servant for an injury caused
by the negligence of the latter while engaged in their common employment.
While it is true that if a servant wholly neglects to carry out his contract with his
employer, he is liable to such employer only and not to third persons, yet if he once
enter upon the duties of his employment he is personally liable to his fellow-servants for an injury caused by his leaving his work in a dangerous condition without proper safeguards. Such an act is misfeasance, and not nonfeasance.
A carpenter at work in the establishment of a manufacturing corporation was
injured because of the negligence of employees of the corporation in leaving a
tackle-block and chains in a dangerous position. Held, that he could maintain an
action against such employees for damages.
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray 99, overruled.

THIS case was heard in the court below upon a demurrer to a
declaration in a suit by one workman against another to recover
damages for an injury, caused by the negligence of the latter while
both were engaged in a common employment. The court below
sustained the demurrer. To this ruling plaintiff excepted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, 0. J.-The declaration is in tort, and the material allegations of fact, which are admitted by the demurrer, are, that while
the plaintiff was at work as a carpenter, in the establishment of a
manufacturing corporation, putting up, by direction of the corporation, certain partitions in a room in which the corporation was
conducting the business of making wire, the defendants, one the
superintendent and the others agents and servants of the corporation, being employed in that business, negligently and without
regard to the safety of persons rightfully in the room, placed a
,tackle-block and chains upon an iron rail suspended from the ceiling of the room, and suffered them to remain there in such a manner and so unprotected from falling that by reason thereof they
fell upon and injured the plaintiff. Upon these facts the plaintiff
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was a fellow-servant of the defendants: Farwell v. Boston Worcester Railroad Co., 4 Mete. 49; Albro v. Agawam Canal Co, 6
Cush. 75; Gilman v. Eastern Railroad Co., 10 Allen 233, and
13 Id. 433; Holden v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 268;
.31organ v. Vale of Neath Railway Co., 5 B. & S. 570, 736, and
Law Rep., I Q. B. 149.
The ruling sustaining the demurrer was based upon the judgment of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice MERRICK, in Albro v.
Jaquith, 4 Gray 99, in which it was held, that a person employed
in the mill of a manufacturing corporation, who sustained injuries
from the escape of inflammable gas, occasioned by the negligence
and unskilfulness of the superintendent of the mill in the management of the apparatus and fixtures used for the purpose of generating, containing, conducting and burning the gas for the lighting
of the mill, could not maintain an action against the superintendent. But, upon consideration, we are all of opinion that that
judgment is supported by no satisfactory reasons, and must be
overruled.
The principal reason assigned was, that no misfeasance or positive act of wrong was charged, and that for nonfeasance, which
was merely negligence in the performance of a duty arising from
some express or implied contract with his principal or employer,
an agent or servant was responsible to him only, and not to any
third person. It is often said in the books that an agent is responsible to third persons for misfeasance only, and not for nonfeasance.
And it is doubtless true that if an agent never does anything
towards carrying out his contract with his principal, but wholly
who
omits and neglects to do so, the principal is the only person
if
But
can maintain any action against him for the nonfeasance.
the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution
in the
of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care
perthird
to
injury
any
cause
to
not
as
so
it,
manner of executing
he
and
acts;
his
of
consequence
sons, which may be the natural
in
things
leaving
and
midway
cannot, by abandoning its execution
person
any
to
liability
from
a dangerous condition, exempt himself
without
who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them
nothing;
doing
or
proper safeguards. This is not nonfeasance,
Dig. 9, 2, 27,
but it is misfeasance, doing improperly: Ulpian, in
8 Gray
Josselyn,
v.
9; Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592; Bell
8
Lawrence,
v.
309; Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen 166; Horner
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Vroom 46. Negligence and unskilfulness in the management of
inflammable gas, by reason of which it escapes and causes injury,
can no more be considered as mere nonfeasance, within the meaning of the rule relied on, than negligence in the control of fire, as
in the case in the Pandects; or of water, as in Bell v. Josselyn;
or of a drawbridge, as in Nowell v. Wright; or of domestic animals, as in Parsonsv. Winchell, and in the case in New Jersey.
In the case at bar, the negligent hanging and keeping by the
defendants of the block and chains, in such a place and manner as
to be in danger of falling upon persons underneath, was a misfeasance or improper dealing with instruments in the defendants' actual
use or control, for which they are responsible to any person lawfully in the room and injured by the fall, and who is not prevented
by his relation to the defendants from maintaining the action. Both
the ground of action and the measure of damages of the plaintiff
are different from those of the master. The master's right of action
against the defendants would be founded upon his contract with
them, and his damages would be for the injury to his property, and
could not include the injury to the person of this plaintiff, because
the master could not be made liable to him for such an injury resulting from the fault of fellow-servants, unless the master had
himself been guilty of negligence in selecting or employing them.
The plaintiff's action is not founded on any contract, but is an
action of tort for injuries which, according to the common experience of mankind, were a natural consequence of the defendants'
negligence. The fact that a wrongful act is a breach of a contract
between the wrongdoer and one person does not exempt him from
the responsibility for it, as a tort, to a third person injured thereby:
Hawkesworth v. Thompson, 98 Mass. 77; Norton v. Sewall, 106
Id. 143; May v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 112 Id. 90; Grinnell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 Id. 299, 305; Ames v.
Union Railway Co., 117 Id. 541; Hulchey v. Methodist Religious
Society, 125 Id. 487; Bapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; George
v. Skivington, L. R., 5 Ex. 1; Parry v. Smith, 4 0. P. Div. 325;
Foulkes v. Metropolitan Railway Co., 4 0. P. Div. 267, and 5 C.
P. Div. 157. This case does not require us to consider whether a
contractor or a servant, who has completed a vehicle, engine or
fixture, and has delivered it to his employer, can be held responsible for an injury afterwards suffered by a third person from a defect in its original construction. See Winterhottom v. Wright, 10
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M. & W. 109; Collis v. Selden, Law Rep., 3 C.P. 495; Albany v.
Cunliff, 2 Comst. 165; Thomas v. Winchester, 2 Seld. 397, 408;
Coughtry v. Globe Woollen Co., 56 N. Y. 124, 127.
It was further suggested in Albro v. Jaquith, that many of the
considerations of justice and policy, which led to the adoption of
the rule that a master is not responsible to one of his servants for
the injurious consequences of negligence of the others, were equally
applicable to actions brought for like causes by one servant against
another. The only such considerations specified were that the
servant, in either case, is presumed to understand and appreciate
the ordinary risk and peril incident to the service, and to predicate
his compensation, in some measure, upon the extent of the hazard
he assumes; and that "the knowledge, that no legal redress is
afforded for damages occasioned by the inattention or unfaithfulness
of other laborers engaged in the same common work, will naturally
induce each one to be not only a strict observer of the conduct of
others, but to be more prudent and careful himself, and thus by
increased vigilance to promote the welfare and safety of all." The
cases cited in support of these suggestions were Farwellv., Boston
. Worcester Railroad Co., 4 Mete. 49, and King v. Boston &
Worcester Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 112, each of which was an action
by a servant against the master; and it is hard to see the force of
the suggestions as applied to an action by one servant against
another servant.
Even the master is not exempt from liability to his servants for
his own negligence; and the servants make no contract with, and
receive no compensation from each other. It may well be doubted
whether a knowledge on the part of the servants, that they were
in no event to be responsible in damages to one another, would tend
to make each more careful and prudent himself. And the mention
by Chief Justice SHAw in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co., of the opportunity of servants, when employed together,
to observe the conduct of each other, and to give notice to theii
common employer of any misconduct, incapacity, or neglect of
duty, was accompanied by a cautious withholding of all opinion
upon the question whether the plaintiff had a remedy against the
person actually in default; and was followed by the statement
(upon which the decision of that case turned, and which has been
affirmed in subsequent cases, some of which have been cited at the
beginning of this opinion), that the rule exempting the master from
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liability to one servant for the fault of a fellow-servant did not
depend upon the existence of any such opportunity, but extended
to cases in which the two servants were employed in different departments of duty, and at a distance from each other: Farwell
v. Bost. 4 Wor. Bailroad Co., 4 Metc. 59-61.
So far as we are informed, there is nothing in any other reported
case, in England or in this country, which countenances the defendant's position, except in Southeote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247; s. c.
25 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 339, decided in the Court of Exchequer in
1856, in which the action was against the master, and Chief Baron
POLLOCK and Barons ALDERSON and BRAMWELL severally delivered oral opinions at the close of the argument. According to one
report, Chief Baron POLLOCK uttered this dictum: "Neither can
one servant maintain an action against another for negligence while
engaged in their common employment :" I H. & N. 250. But the
other report contains no such dictum, and represents Baron ALDERSON as remarking that he was "not prepared to say that the person
actually causing the negligence" (evidently meaning " causing the
injury," or "guilty of the negligence "), "whether the master or
servant, would not be liable :" 25 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 340. The
responsibility of one servant for an injury caused by his own negligence to a fellow-servant was admitted in two considered judgments of the same court, the one delivered by Baron ALDERSON,
four months before the decision in Southeote v. Stanley, and the
other by Baron BRAMWELL, eight months afterwards: Wiggett v.
Pox, 11 Ex. 832, 839; -Deggv. Midland Bailway Co., 1 H. & N.
773, 781. It has since been clearly asserted by Barons POLLOCK
and HUDDLESTON: Swainson v. Northeastern Bailway Co., 3 Ex.
Div. 341, 343. And it has been affirmed by direct adjudication in
Scotland, in Indiana, and in Minnesota: WFright v. Roxburgh,
2 Ct. of Sess. Cas. (3d series) 748; Hinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind.
121; Hinds v. Overacker, 66 Id. 547; Griffiths v. Wolfram,
22 Minn. 185.
Exceptions sustained.
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Supreme Court of Vermont.
EASTERN TOWNSHIPS BANK v. BEEBE & Co.
A company, doing business in Canada, composed of members, some of whom
li ,cd in Canada and some in Vermont, indorsed a note to a bank. The bank
In
brought suit in Canada and obtained judgment against the company as indorser.
an action based upon the same promise as the Canada suit. Held,
1. The foreign judgment does not merge the cause of action, and assumnsit will
lie upon the same cause in Vermont.
2. The foreign judgment is of no higher nature as a cause of action than the
notes declared on.
A domestic judgment constitutes of itself a debt of record; a foreign judgment
is only pirinafacieevidence of indebtedness; the one is a contract of record, incontrovertible, and is the basis of an action of debt, while only an action of assumpsit
or debt on simple contract will lie upon the other.

THF defendant company, which was composed of members living
in Vermont and of others living in Canada, being sued in Vermont, pleaded that plaintiff had previously sued and obtainedjudgment in Canada for the same debt.
John Young and Crane & Alfred, for plaintiff.
Edwards & Dickerman, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
is not claimed that the pendency of the suit
BARRETT, J.-It
suit was brought could bar a recovery in this
this
in Canada when
the judgment in said suit in Canada, renthat
suit. It is claimed
of this suit, bars a recovery in this suit.
bringing
dered after the
that said Canadian judgment has
claimed
It is not averred or
only question is, whether said
the
So
been satisfied by payment.
as
Canadian judgment merges the cause of action in such a sense
this
in
judgment
a
of
to render it incapable of being the subject
suit. It is not so merged unless it has become a debt of record,
so that the record itself has become a cause of action of its own
vigor, to be declared upon as such, and when produced, is conclusive of the right.
All the authorities agree that a suit in Vermont for getting satisfaction of the Canadian judgment must be an action of assumpsit,
the excounting upon an implied promise arising from the fact of
foreign
a
that
cases
the
in
held
is
It
istence of such judgment.
juristhe
within
matter
a
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judgment when shown in evidence
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diction of the court and in which the court had jurisdiction of the
parties, so that they were personally bound by the judgment in the
country where rendered, is conclusive upon the matter therein adjudicated. But it at the same time is held that the original cause
of action is not so merged by that judgment that it is incapable of
being the subject of a suit in a country foreign to that in which
the judgment was recovered.
The books are uniform in making the distinction between merger
of the cause of action and conclusiveness of effect as matter of evidence, when the effect of a foreign judgment is brought in question
in a suit upon the same original cause of action.
Whatever may be the reason for such distinction, it exists and
is established as a rule of law, and we see no occasion for annulling
that rule in this state. In the many cases in which the subject
of judgments, as between the different states of the Union, has
been discussed and determined, the theory and logic have rested
upon. the provision of the United States Constitution as to the
faith and credit to be given to judgments of one state in the other
states, and in all the cases it is assumed that but for such provision such judgments would not have that faith and credit, and
would be foreign judgments.
A specimen case of this kind is McGilvray J Co. v. Avery, 30
Vt. 538, in which the very able opinion drawn up by Judge BENNETT presents the established doctrine and marks the true distinctions. It is fundamental that a foreign judgment does not constitute a record debt, but is only evidence of obligation to pay. The
indebtedness evidenced by a foreign judgment as a cause of action
to be declared on, as the ground of recovery is that of simple contract, and the subject for a suit in assumpsit.
In this case then, the judgment in Canada as a cause oJ action
is of no higher grade than the notes themselves. This legal fact
is conclusive against the idea of the notes as a cause of action
being merged by that judgment. It leaves that judgment as an
instrument or means of evidence, showing conclusively the fact of
indebtedness and operating conclusively to that effect until satisfied.
It is not the judgment but the satisfaction of it that renders it a
bar to a recovery in the domestic government upon the original
cause of action. This is in harmony with the conclusive effect
given to a foreign judgment in favor of the defendant. The fact
of such judgment is pleaded in bar, and is adduced as evidence to
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maintain the plea. This is the same, mutatis mutandis, as addu
cing the fact of a foreign judgment for the plaintiff to maintains
his right of recovery against the defendant in his action of assumpsit upon that judgment. The confusion on this subject seems to
result from not distinguishing between a domestic judgment as constituting of itself a debt of record and a foreign judgment, which
is only evidence of an indebtedness as upon a simple contract.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY v.
BARRETT FT AL.
Where goods are received by a common carrier to be forwarded in the usual course
of business, his liability immediately attaches; and if they are lost by an accidental
fire while in his warehouse awaiting transportation, he is liable.
But if the delivery is accompanied with instructions not to forward until further
otders, or if anything remains to be done to the goods by the shipper before they are
to be forwarded, such liability as a common carrier does not attach.
The assent of the shipper to conditions in a bill of lading or other contract for the
carriage of goods, limiting the carrier's liability, is binding upon him when the loss
happens without fault or negligence of the carrier, but such assent will not be implied
or presumed from facts and circumstances which do not clearly show an assent to
such conditions in the contract on which the action is founded.
Neither usage nor custom, though known to the shipper, which he has not clearly
assented to as a condition of the contract of shipment, can be set up to absolve a
carrier from his common-law liability.

to the District Court of Greene county.
On the 22d of February and 5th of March 1873, Barrett &
Walton delivered to plaintiff in error, a common carrier by rail:
one hundred and forty tierces of lard, to be shipped to Colgate &
Co., New York, to whom it had been sold deliverable on the cars
at Spring Valley station, on the line of defendant's road. On the
night of March 14th, while the lard was stored in defendant's
warehouse awaiting shipment, it was destroyed by an accidental
fire which originated in a store adjoining the warehouse, and without fault or negligence of the plaintiff in error, communicated to
and destroyed the warehouse and all its contents.
The lard was delivered with instructions for immediate shipment. Nothing remained to be done to it by the shippers before
ERROR
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being loaded into the cars and sent forward. This was to be done
by the railroad company without any further orders or directions
from the plaintiffs.
The present action was to recover the value of the goods so
lost.
The answer of the company admitted its character as a public
carrier of goods, and the receipt, storage and destruction of the
lard; but averred that ever since its road was opened and operated,
to thirty years, to the present time, it had been
some twenty-five
its constant usage and custom, known to the plaintiffs, to receive
goods for carriage, at this and all its other stations, upon the condition alone that it would not be held to have received the goods
until they were actually put on board the cars, and that it would
not be liable for loss, by fire, not the result of its own, or its servants'
or agents' neglect or default.
It is averred that,.with knowledge of all these things, the lard
was delivered and stored in said warehouse, "upon the agreement
and understanding that defendant should be liable only on said
conditions," and that when the goods were loaded upon the cars, a
bill of lading was to be issued therefor, in accordance with said
custom, and containing said provisions.
These conditions, material to the case, are as follows:
- 2. Freight carried by this company must be removed from the
station during business hours on the day of its arrival, or it will be
stored at the owner's risk and expense; and in the event of its
destruction, or damage from any cause while in the depot of the
company, it is agreed that said company shall not be liable to pay
any damage therefor.
"3. It is agreed, and is part of the consideration of this contract, that the company will not be responsible for * * * loss or
damage to goods occasioned by providential causes, or by fire from
any cause whatever, while in transit or at stations.
"7. The company will not be responsible for accidents or delays
from unavoidable causes. The responsibility of this company as a
common carrier, under this bill of lading, to commence on the
removal of the goods from the depot in the cars of the company,
and to terminate when unloaded from the cars at the place of delivery."
Upon a trial there was a verdict for plaintiff; a motion for a
new trial which was overruled; a bill of exceptions taken by the
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defendant; and a judgment which, on error, was affirmed by the
District Court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J.-That this lard was received by the defendant as
a common carrier, for immediate shipment to Colgate & Co.; that
nothing further remained to be done by the shipper, or any further
orders, directions or instructions were to be given before such shipment; that it was destroyed by an accidental fire while stored in
the defendant's warehouse awaiting shipment, which had been delayed by the defendant's inability to obtain the necessary cars,
owing to a press of business at that season of the year, are facts
conceded or clearly established by the testimony.
It also clearly appears that there was such general usage or
custom as alleged known to the plaintiffs, and that at the time of
the delivery of these goods they did not receive, or expect to receive,
a bill of lading therefor until the lard was loaded into the cars;
and when one was issued it would contain the conditions as to loss
by fire shown and set out in the answer.
The principles of law applicable to the facts of this case may be
summarily stated as follows:
1. Upon a delivery and acceptance of goods, under the circumstances stated, the common-law liability of a common carrier immediately attached, and if they were lost by fire while awaiting
shipment, the carrier is liable to the same extent as if the goods
were in transit, unless his liability has been modified, limited or

restricted with the consent of the owner or shipper of the goods:
Merriam v. The ffarford & N. H. Railroad (o., 20 Conn. 354;
Trowbridge v. Chapin, 23 Conn. 595; 2 Redfield on Railways,
sect. 174, p. 65; Ford v. Mitchell, 21 Ind. 54; Gleason v. Transportation Co., 32 Wis. 85; O'Bannon v. Southern Express Co.,
51 Ala. 481; Grosvenor v. . Y. Central Railroad Co., 39 N.
Y. 84; The illinois Central Railroad (o. v. Smyser, 38 Ill.
354; Burrell v. North, 2 Car. & Kir. 680; Schouler on Bailments, 381, ch. 4.
2. But if anything remained to be done to the goods by the shipper
before they are ready for transportation, or if any orders, directions
or instructions were to be given before they were to be forwarded,
such liability does not attach: Judson v. Western Railroad Co.,
4 Allen 520; Moses v. Boston & Maine Railroad,4 Foster (24 N.
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H.) 71; Blossom v. Griffin, 3 Kernan 573; Michigan Southern
Railroad v. Shurtz, 7 Mich. 515; St. Louzs, &c., Railroad v.
Montgomery, 39 Ill. 335; Lawrence v. W. & St. P. Railway, 15
Minn. 390; Watts v. Boston & Lowell Railroad,106 Mass. 466,
Barronv. .Eldredge, 100 Id. 457.
3. The carrier may limit his common-law liability for losses
happening without his fault or negligence by a contract, either
verbal or in writing. In an action against him as such carrier,
when hb has received and undertaken to carry goods, the burden
is upon him to establish such modified or limited liability, and to
show that the loss falls within the terms of the agreement: Graham v. -Davis,4 Ohio St. 362; Gaine v. Union Transportation
Co., 28 Id. 418.
4. The assent of the shipper or owner of goods to conditions
limiting common-law liability is not to be implied or presumed; but
in each case of an action for a loss the assent must be shown by
competent evidence, as in other cases of contract. As the carrier
is bound to receive and transport all goods offered, for a reasonable
compensation, subject to all the responsibility incident to the employment, the presumption is, in the absence of proof sufficient to
remove it and to fix a different liability, that the shipper intended
to insist on his common-law right: 1New Jersey v. Merchants'
Bank, 6 Howard 344; Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 376;
Adams Express v. Nock, 2 Duval 563; Railroad v. Nan. Co.,
16 Wallace 329.
5. In each case the question is, what are the terms of the contract of shipment? Are they such as the law prescribes or such
as the parties agreed to ? This being a question of fact, usage or
custcin cannot be set up to absolve the carrier from his ordinary
duties, which public policy, his general undertaking or his special
promise may have bound him to do: Coxe v. Heisley, 19 Penn. St.
243; MeMasters v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 69 Id. 374;
The Sultana v. Chapman, 5 Wis. 454; Oox et al. v. Peterson, 30
Ala. 608; Schouler on Bailments 442.
Upon a careful review of the testimony, which consists mainly
of the evidence by the plaintiffs themselves, one of whom had for
many years been, and was at the time this lard was received, also
the agent for the carrier who received and stored the same, and
was diligent as such agent in trying to procure cars for shipping it,
we think the allegation in the answer to the effect that said goods
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